Strategic Behaviors in Double-Ended Queues: Multi-Population Game Theoretic Approach
Speaker: Tuan Phung-Duc
Affiliation: University of Tsukuba
Abstract
We consider double-ended queues, which represent a brief version of a market with demand (e.g., passengers) and supply (e.g., taxis) arriving at the system according to stochastic processes for matching with zero or positive time. In order to optimally design these queues, it is important to understand the strategic behaviors of agents (demand side or supply side). In this study, we consider queueing game-theoretical analysis for several cases where only the demand side or both of the demand and supply sides are strategic. Joint work with Hung Q. Nguyen (University of Tsukuba).
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