Speaker: Professor Moshe Haviv (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

I will deal with the standard single server queue model with waiting costs and service rewards. Special attention will be given to the issue of waiting times, externalities and the difference between them in terms of decision making. Two criteria will be looked at when dealing with the decision whether or not to join the queue: individual optimization and social optimization. The concept of Nash equilibrium and its applications to unobservable queues will be introduced. Next we will look at the issue of how to regulate the queue, namely how to make individual customer behave in a socially optimal way. This goal can be achieved by the introduction of entry fees or contracts, or by selecting an appropriate queue discipline. The above will be then repeated for the observable version of this decision making.

About Statistics, modelling and operations research seminars

Students, staff and visitors to UQ are welcome to attend our regular seminars.

The events are jointly run by our Operations research and Statistics and probability research groups.

Seminars are usually held on Tuesdays from 11am to 12pm.

Information for speakers

Plan to speak for up to 40 minutes, and allow up to 15 minutes for questions and discussion.

Pitch your presentation to an interdisciplinary mathematical audience.

To avoid technical delays on the day, contact us a few days in advance of your presentation to discuss requirements.

You can either email us your presentation in advance, or save it to a memory stick. Microsoft PowerPoint presentations and PDFs are the most convenient file formats, but you can also run the talk from your own laptop.


Priestley Building (67)